Emerging Law of the Sea:
The Economic Zone Dilemma*
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The fourth substantive session of the United Nations Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is now a part of
history. Among the many accomplishments of the session, one of
particular importance is the reduction of the list of outstanding
issues from hundreds to a critical few. This statement is not a suggestion that all else has been agreed, but a clear focus now exists
upon solving the major outstanding problems with the hope that the
smaller difficulties will then fall into place. Undoubtedly, the
primary problems are those concerning the regime and machinery
of the seabeds beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, including
the system of access, the financing of the enterprise, and a timely
mechanism review. However, another issue of major importance
is the questicn of the precise nature and legal status of the belt
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of water adjacent to the territorial seas which is now being called
the exclusive economic zone.
The concept of the economic zone has its roots in some rather
familiar doctrinal soil. Like many other theories of the past, it
attempts to accommodate the desires of coastal States to achieve
increased competence over adjacent seas for resource management
(and other purposes) with the needs of States wishing to keep the
seas open for maximum flexible use. This article will examine the
familiar efforts of the past and evaluate the progress of the
economic-zone concept in the current law of the sea negotiations.
BACKGROUND:

EXTENDED CLAIMS TO COMPETENCE

IN THE OCEANS

Sovereign States have long guarded, and occasionally expanded,
their territorial prerogatives. Some of these expansions were
politically inspired and produced actual conflict. Others were projected to preserve or advance pre-existing rights. One example of
expansion is the steady encroachment of coastal State claims to
regulate fisheries and to conserve living resources in the coastal
seas which has occurred over the past thirty years. This kind of
incursion does not involve territorial claims by one State upon the
sovereignty of another. Thus it has not engendered violent response. However, this expansion does reflect the movement of
coastal States into an area that has variously been perceived as
the territory of all States, the territory of none, or the common
heritage of mankind. International resistance to this sort of incursion is normally of a much lower order than is that to physical
invasion of a sovereign territory. However, it is of sufficient magnitude to provide a basis for serious disagreement among States
who perceive the order of the oceans in different ways.
Extra-territorialClaimsin Historical Perspective
The most extensive extra-territorial claims over the oceans were
those asserted during the fifteenth century by the then dominant
world powers, Spain and Portugal. In 1493 the conflicting interests
of these two States resulted in a virtual division of the world by
papal bull. The bull Inter Caetera assigned those interests east
of an imaginery line 100 leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde

Islands to Portugal and those west of the line to Spain.' Although
astounding to modern sensibilities, this division was extremely
logical. Pope Alexander simply identified the major users of ocean
space and accommodated their national interests. In a modern context, the Law of the Sea Conference is seeking to do precisely the
same thing on a much more complicated scale. What is involved
is the identification of the interests not of two but of more than
100 nations with respect to more than seventy discrete issues. The
objective now, as then, is the creation of a logical global system
which will reduce the potential for conflict.
Soon after Pope Alexander's decree, other nations, especially
England and the Netherlands, became active in world trade and
set about the task of undoing the world the Spanish and the Portuguese had built. An inexorable shift of emphasis occurred from the
creation of national enclaves to the enhancement of trade through
enshrining the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas. Carving
up the oceans was deemed unfeasible because the seas were considered too vast and their resources inexhaustible. The Grotian concept of the oceans and the resulting doctrine of the freedom of the
seas successfully shifted the emphasis of ocean politics and served
the cause of international trade and navigation for over 300 years.2
Only recently has this venerable doctrine been subject to question.
It is now clear that the oceans are truly not infinite in their
bounty." New technologies have created increasing doubts that the
oceans should be without adequate resource management. Coastal
States have recently begun to address the special relationship that
they have to resources near their coasts and the rights and obligations that arise because of this nexus.4 Heightened significance
1. Bull Inter Caetera (Alexander VI) of May 4, 1493. This document

was subsequently both confirmed and modified by the Treaty of Tordesillas
between Spain and Portugal signed on June 7, 1494. That treaty was in
turn confirmed by the bull Eq Quae (Julius II) of January 24, 1506.
2. The work of Grotius has been expansively commented upon. It is
best to refer directly to his writings. H. GROTIUS, MARE LIERUm (Magoffin
trans. 1916).
3. For one view of the state of U.S. fisheries and the problem of overfishing of certain stocks, see REPORT

OF THE HOUSE MERCHANT MARINE AND
FISHERIS COMMITTEE ON THE MARINE FIsHEms CONSERVATION ACT,H.R. Doc.

No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This report is typical of the literature on the subject.
4. A clear exposition of the nexus is found in the preamble to the Declaration of Santiago:
Governments are under an obligation to secure the necessary conditions of subsistence for their peoples and to provide them with
the means for their economic development. Consequently, it is
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was attached to this relationship in 1945, when President Truman
issued his now-famous proclamation. The Truman Proclamation
stated that the natural resources of the subsoil and the seabed of
the United States continental shelf "appertained" to the U.S. and
were subject to its jurisdiction and control. 5
This claim, as well as the reasons used in its justification, has
significance for the development of the economic-zone concept. The
Truman Proclamation argued that:
(a) the shelf's resources should not be exploited without the
assistance of the coastal State and that thus the State had a special
interest;
(b) the continental shelf was no more than the natural extension of the dry land mass and thus naturally appurtenant to the
coastal State;
(c) the shelf's resources were to be found in pools or deposits
associated with the land within territorial limits; and
(d) self-protection required a coastal State to monitor activi6
ties offshore, particularly those involving foreign nations.
These and similar nexus arguments have become the framework
for justifying recent claims to extend State competence seaward.
The Truman Proclamation was the first major assertion of rights
to resource jurisdiction. It reflected the contemporary political
climate and the pressures generated by new technology. For the
first time, extraction of oil and gas from the submerged land of
the continental shelves was practical and economic. The Proclamation, designed to assure the stable investment climate desired by
their duty to provide for the conservation and protection of their
natural resources and to regulate the exploitation of those resources
to the best advantage of their respective countries ....

It is there-

fore also their duty to prevent exploitation of the said resources
outside their jurisdiction from jeopardizing the existence, integrity
and conservation of this wealth to the detriment of nations which,
owing to their geographical positions possess in their seas irreplaceable sources of subsistence and vital economic resources.
[1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. Cozn'N 169-70.
5. Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to
the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf,

Sept. 28, 1945, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1948).
6. Id. See also the remarks of Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser of the
State Department (May 13, 1955), quoted in 4 M. WwTEmAN, DIGEST OF INTERlATiONAL LAW 761 (1965).

American oil companies, created a precedent which was soon
emulated by other littoral States in claims based on the arguable
impacts on economic, political, social, or military interests. In
short, the Truman Proclamation ushered in the modern era of unilateralism in the oceans.
Although the Truman doctrine subsequently received international sanction by the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf, 7 the pattern it established paved the way for the evolution
of the economic zone, or patrimonial sea. The United States claim
also gave strength and comfort to a variety of nations which had
made, or were to make, claims of an even more comprehensive
nature.8 In 1952, the Inter-American Juridical Committee submitted a draft convention (later rejected by the Organization of
American States) which declared that under international law
coastal States had sovereignty over the continental shelf and the
waters above it. The draft convention would also have recognized
the right of coastal States to establish areas of "protection, control,
and economic exploitation" to a distance of 200-nautical miles. 9
During the same year Chile, Ecuador, and Peru signed the Declaration of Santiago proclaiming "as a rule of their international maritime policy" the exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction of each to
200 miles from their respective coastlines.' 0 This action solidly
reflected the mood of the time and the trend in Latin and Central
America. Such claims were based in part upon the nexus between
the coastal State and the sea. Additionally the Truman doctrine
was cited as precedent.'
A review of the past actions of nations reveals the emergence
of a distinct pattern. As States became aware of the benefits of
modern technology and the increased abilities of technically advanced nations to exploit the ocean's resources, new problems began
7. Convention on the Continental Shelf, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,

499 U.N.T.S., in force June 10, 1964.
8. E.g., the declaration by Chile of a 200-nautical-mile maritime zone,
Supreme Resolution No. 179, Apr. 11, 1953; the Ecuadorian Executive Accord of Nov. 10, 1966, and the Decree Law No. 1542, Registro Official, No.
158, Nov. 11, 1966; and the Peruvian Supreme Decree No. 781, Aug. 1, 1947.
9. See 4 M. WmTEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (1965).
10. Declaration of Santiago, reprinted in English in [1956] 1 Y.B. INTL
L. COMm'N 257.
11. As of December 1975, the State Department reported that of the nine
States claiming 200-mile territorial seas, seven were in Central and South
America. It is within this geographical area that the economic zone has
received strong and effective support. BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 36, Limits in the Seas, NATIONAL
CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTIONS (3d ed. rev. 1975).
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to develop. First, States feared that advanced technology would
destroy resources at an unprecedented rate unless adequate controls
were exercised to some significant distance from the coasts.
Second, the advance of technology, making the harvesting of living
and non-living resources more feasible, was seen as widening, at an
alarming rate, the gap between the developed and developing
countries. Therefore a regime was conceived to deal with both
these apprehensions.
It is not only the developing countries which perceive benefits
in extended claims to jurisdiction. While the executive branch of
the United States government has long opposed unilateral action
similar to that taken by others, has protested extended foreign
claims, and has carefully worded agreements with countries making
extended claims in order to avoid recognizing these claims, the
Congress has clearly not been of the same mind. Aware of increased
pressure on fish stocks in waters adjacent to the U.S. generated
by highly mobile and efficient foreign fleets, the Congress has been
determined to assert whatever jurisdiction is required to protect
the interests of the domestic fishing industry, particularly in New
England and Alaska and on the northwest Pacific coast. The
objections of executive agencies, in particular those of the Department of State, were couched primarily in terms of the impact of
unilateralism on the 1976 UNCLOS.12 Spectres of conflict were
conjured, but little was said about the impact of congressional
action on U.S. industry. Arguments were made that the UNCLOS
would fail because of the bad faith of the United States.
Despite these legitimate concerns, the Congress, in 1975, passed,
and the President signed, the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.13 This Act establishes a fishery conservation zone extending seaward to a limit of 200-nautical miles.
Within this zone the U.S. has extensive management and licensing
powers. Although the impact on the UNCLOS has not reached the
12. See, e.g., the testimony of John Norton Moore, then Chairperson of
the National Security Council's Interagency Task Force on the Law of the
Sea. Hearings on Amendment No. 946 to S. 1134 Before the Subcomm.

on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 929 (1974).

13. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82
(Supp. 2, 1976)) (effective Mar. 1, 1977).

anticipated magnitude, little doubt exists that it has had an effect,
both on the U.S. negotiating position and because such action tends
to preempt the UNCLOS' work. Other nations, including Norway,
Mexico, and Canada, have moved toward extended jurisdiction,
although in the nature of a more exclusive economic zone, and the
European Economic Community has now followed suit.
These and similar actions have put pressure upon the UNCLOS
to complete its work before it becomes mooted by a series of similar
or related moves by large numbers of coastal States. New claims
could reach the level of territorial assertions. In addition, the U.S.
14
may soon add to the ante by enacting a deep-seabed mining bill.
Unilateral, extra-territorial assertions reflect a need which has
also been recognized by treaty. Article 24 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone provides:
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea,
the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea. 15
The Article mandates that these zones may not extend beyond
twelve miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. A similar contiguous-zone provision is
found in the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT), used as a
working document by the UNCLOS. 1' Although the contiguouszone concept in the 1958 treaty does not deal with resources, it is
an explicit recognition that States need certain special competences
in waters adjacent to their territorial sea, however limited. The
International Law Commission in its preparatory documents indicated that international law already accorded States the right to
exercise preventive or protective control for special purposes with14. In the past a number of bills have been initiated concerning deepseabed mining. All have received some degree of opposition from the ad-

ministration. The pressure for such legislation continues to mount. See,
e.g., the report of Congressmen Paul McCloskey and Benjamin Gilman
reprinted in the Congressional Record on September 29, 1976. 122 CONG.
REc. 149 (1976). McCloskey and Gilman have been strong supporters of

the U.S. law of the sea effort, and their support for a bill of this nature
is significant.

15. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.T.

1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, in force Sept. 10, 1964.

16. Article 32, Revised Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/
WP. 8/Rev. 1/pt. 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as RSNT].
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out affecting the legal status of the waters as high seas. 17 It is also
fairly clear that the Commission did not intend the list of zones in
the Article to be exclusive, nor was the Article intended to bar
parties to the convention from asserting rights which they had
previously claimed under customary international law or other
treaties. The contiguous-zone concept is now settled international
law and is one of the foundations of the economic zone.
Although over the years claims to extra-territorial competence
have been many and varied, McDougal and Burke suggest that all
can be placed in one of several categories:
1. Claims relating to control of access to contiguous areas;
2. Claims to competence to prescribe authority;
3. Claims to competence to apply authority;
4. Claims relating to the exclusive appropriation of resources in
adjacent submarine areas.' 8
This classification is clearly a more rigorous approach to a full
understanding of unilateralism than that undertaken here. However, one of the authors' generalizations is particularly important.
The lawfulness of states' claims to an occasional exclusive competence in contiguous areas must of course be appraised in terms
of the more general policy underlying the whole public order of
the oceans, which, as we have seen, is that of securing the fullest
production of values compatible with their equitable distribution.
Generally speaking, this goal is to be sought by protecting the
widest ambit of inclusive use and competence and restricting exclusive authority, comprehensive or occasional, to the narrowest bound
possible-on the theory that freedom of use to all who possess the
necessary capabilities is desirable for fullest production and widest
distribution. It must be recognized, however, that there are certain
exclusive interests, common to all states, which may require exercise of unilateral protective measures in the contiguous areas
beyond the territorial sea.19

Each of the examples included in this article must be evaluated
in terms of its reasonableness in context and in light of the general
views of the international community. This evaluation is the true
task of the UNCLOS when it considers the economic zone. It
must decide whether it will indeed secure the fullest possible pro17. Commentary I to Article 66, Doc. A/3159, pp. 39-40, [1956] 2 Y.B.

INT'L L. COMm'N 253,

18. M.
(1962).

McDOUGAL

19. Id. at 578.

294-95.
&

W. BURKE, THE PuBLIc ORDER OP

THE OCEANS

575

duction of values, taking into account their equitable distribution.
Although some other formulation may prove politically acceptable,
only a provision which meets this test will also withstand the test
of time.
THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

The zone is the most recent manifestation of attempts to accommodate the polarized views of the UNCLOS. Those coastal States
with existing declarations of extended jurisdiction (limited or
absolute) as far seaward as 200-nautical miles came to the UNCLOS
with expectations of justifying these prior claims. Included in
this group of "territorialists" are nations such as Peru, Ecuador,
and El Salvador. On the other side, maritime powers such as the
United States traditionally claimed narrow limits of national jurisdiction in order to increase naval mobility and for similar purposes.
Obviously the divergent positions of these two groups would not
converge, and thus a new development was needed to break the incipient deadlock. This development was the economic zone.
A forerunner of the economic-zone concept, the Patrimonial Sea,
was developed in the early seventies. 20 This concept was formalized in 1972 in a declaration adopted (ten in favor and five abstentions) by the Specialized Conference of the Caribbean Countries
on Problems of the Sea held in the Dominican Republic. 2 1 At
20. The name Patrimonial Sea is credited to Edmundo Vargas Carreno,
a Chilean professor, who was said to have been the first to use it in an
official document. A. Aguilar, The Patrimonial Sea, Proceedings of the
Seventh Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, University of
Rhode Island, June 26-29, 1972, at 165.
21. The pertinent provisions of the Santo Domingo Declaration are:
PatrimonialSea
1. The coastal state has sovereign rights over the renewable and

non-renewable natural resources, which are found in the waters,

the seabed, and in the subsoil of an area adjacent to the territorial
sea, called the patrimonial sea.
2. The coastal state has the duty to promote and the right to
regulate the conduct of scientific research within the patrimonial
sea, as well as the right to adopt the necessary measures to prevent
marine pollution and to ensure its sovereignty over the resources
of the area.
3. The breadth of this zone should be subject of an international
agreement, preferably of a worldwide scope. The whole of the area
of both the territorial sea and the patrimonial sea, taking into account geographic circumstances, should not exceed a maximum of
200 nautical miles.
4. Delimitation of this zone between two or more states should
be carried out in accordance with the peaceful procedures stipulated in the charter of the United Nations.
5. In this zone ships and aircraft of all states, whether coastal
or not, should enjoy the right of freedom of navigation and overflight with no restrictions other than those resulting from the exer-
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the same time, a group of experts from Africa met in Yaounde,
Cameroon, and produced proposals endorsing an economic zone.
In August 1972, the principles elaborated were introduced by Kenya
in the form of draft articles to the Preparatory Committee on the
Law of the Sea. In April 1973, representatives of African nations assembled in Addis Ababa drafted a declaration which was
subsequently adopted by the Organization of African Unity. Thus
the principle of the economic zone was emerging on two continents.

22

When the first substantive session of the UNCLOS convened in
Caracas in 1974, the third world was clearly prepared to endorse
this new concept. The United States, however, approached the
subject with considerable caution. After initial opposition, the
chief of the U.S. delegation stated that the U.S. was prepared to
negotiate a new treaty on the basis of "Broad coastal state jurisdiction over living and non-living resources beyond the territorial
sea."2 3a Nevertheless, the United States indicated that there had
to be concomitant responsibility on coastal States to respect the
legitimate interests of other States in the area. Ambassador
Stevenson elaborated on the U.S. position in his formal statement
to the plenary meeting.
[W]e are prepared to accept, and indeed we would welcome
general agreement on a 12-mile outer limit for the territorial sea
and a 200-mile outer limit for the economic zone provided it is part
of an acceptable comprehensive package, including a satisfactory
for
regime within and beyond the economic zone and provision
24
unimpeded transit of straits used for international navigation.

He specified that the economic zone should not impinge upon the
rights of other States, traditionally viewed to be high seas rights.
cise by the coastal state of its rights within the area. Subject only
to these limitations, there will also be freedom for the laying of

submarine cables and pipelines.
Declaration of Santo Domingo, Specialized Conference of the Caribbean
Countries on Problems of the Sea, June 7, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/80
(1972).
22. For a comparative review of the African and Latin positions, see the
statement made by H.E. Mr. C.G. Maina, head of the delegation of Kenya
to the Law of the Sea Conference, Caracas, July 2, 1974.
23. Statement of Ambassador John R. Stevenson, head of the U.S. delegation to the UNCLOS, at a press conference in Caracas on June 20, 1974.
24. Statement of John R. Stevenson in plenary session on June 11, 1974.

Unfortunately, other formal statements clearly showed that some
nations favored much stronger coastal State rights.
It became obvious that the problems surrounding the economic
zone could not be negotiated adequately in full committee and that
another approach was necessary. Minister Jens Evensen of Norway
suggested and convened an informal group of juridical experts from
a number of countries, acting in their personal capacities, to determine if grounds existed for mutual accommodation. This "Evensen
Group" eventually spent months producing the necessary texts.
Although the concept was strong because all major coastal State
viewpoints were represented, it lacked African support. The format of the group was simple. Minister Evensen monitored the discussions on the zone and produced a series of draft articles, each
refined on the basis of further discussion. At the completion of
the sixth draft, he forwarded the product of these consultations
to the chairman of the Second Committee as his own work product,
binding no nation.
The sixth draft covered two major areas, general articles on the
economic zone and specific rules respecting fisheries. Minister
Evensen concluded that the coastal State had a right to establish
an exclusive zone in which it had "Sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources, whether renewable or non-renewable, of the seabed and
subsoil and the superjacent waters."125 These same States, he con-

cluded, should have jurisdiction over marine scientific research and
marine pollution and over establishing artificial islands and installations, but only under terms to be provided for in the UNCLOS.
All other States were to enjoy the freedoms of navigation, overflight, and laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and "other
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to navigation and
communication.1

26

Much of the Evensen text found its way into the Single
Negotiating Text (SNT) 27 prepared by Reynaldo Galindo Pohl,
Chairman of the Second Committee, at the conclusion of the second
substantive session of the UNCLOS in Geneva. The SNT became
the basic negotiating document for further work.
In an obvious attempt to accommodate the Group of 77 and
others, Galindo Pohl made some significant changes in the Evensen
25. Art. 1, Evensen 6th rev., April 16, 1975.
26. Id. Art. 3.
27. Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/pt. 2 (1975)
Ehereinafter cited as SNT].
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text, despite the fact that the text had been painfully negotiated
over a long period of time. Although Evensen had given coastal
States exclusive resource management jurisdiction, he had restricted other rights, particularly with respect to science and
pollution in accordance with rules contained in the treaty. Galindo
Pohl was more liberal toward the coastal States, according them
unhampered jurisdiction over these activities and reducing the
rights of other States in the zone. 28 He added the word exclusive
to the name economic zone. Additionally, and more significantly,

he authored the introductory article to the high seas chapter: "The
term 'high seas,' as used in the present Convention means all parts
of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone,
in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State."29 Because the Evensen Group had not discussed the high seas, there was no equivalent
provision in its text. Taken in the context of the economic zone
articles, this article states that the zone is not to be considered high

seas. Andres Aguilar, presently chairman of the Second Committee, has endorsed this concept in his report, clearly showing that
he views the zone as neither territorial seas nor high seas, but as

a zone sui generis. 30

28. Especially id. arts. 45 & 47.
29. Id. SNT article 73 now appears in the RSNT, supra note 16, pt. 2, as
article 75.
30. In May 1975, Ambassador Aguilar wrote in his introductory note:
16. It was perhaps unfortunate that the issue was addressed in
terms of the definition of the high seas in article 75. There could
be little debate as to which of the provisions in the chapter on the
high seas apply in the exclusive economic zone, whether included
in the definition of high seas or not.
17. Nor is there any doubt that the exclusive economic zone is neither the high seas nor the territorial sea. It is a zone sui generis.
18. As has often been pointed out, the matter should be addressed
in terms of the "residual rights". In simple terms, the rights as
to resources belong to the coastal State and, in so far as such rights
are not infringed, all other States enjoy the freedoms of navigation
and communication. In fact, this is specified in general terms in
article 46, when read in conjunction with articles 44 and 47. Many
had thought that these provisions dealt adequately with the matter.
My original intention to point the way to a compromise solution

would have related closely to these provisions. And I would encourage a reorientation of the discussion around these articles.
RSNT, supra note 16, pt. 2. And in September he wrote:
26. I continue to believe that the comments which I made with
regard to this point in various paragraphs of my introductory note,
particularly in paragraphs 17 and 18, indicate the appropriate path
for a compromise solution in connection with that subject.
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/L. 17 (1976).

The result of the work of Pohl and Aguilar is a text that gives
to other States the rights in the economic zone of freedom of navigation, overflight, the laying of cables and pipelines, and rights
related to navigation and communication. All other rights accrue
to the coastal State. The maritime States, in particular the United
States, have vigorously opposed this approach. The U.S. position
has been that the seas of the economic zone, except for rights specifically granted to the coastal State by the Convention, should retain
their status as high seas. In other words, creating an economic zone
should not alter the basic character of the high seas.
At this juncture the UNCLOS has stalled on the issue. Neither
side has been willing to yield, and both have adamantly decried
the inflexibility of the other. No procedural device has been adequate to do more than reflect the depth of the schism within
31
Committee II.
At first blush it may seem that the difference between the two
views is not significant. What do the maritime powers want to
do in the zone that they may not do under the present wording of
Articles 44, 46, 47, and 75 of the RSNT? 32 The answer is compli31. See the Report of the Chairman of Committee II, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.

62/L. 17 (1976), for a description of the negotiating devices used during

that session to attempt to reach a compromise.

32. For ready reference purposes, Articles 44 and 46 are reproduced here:
Article 44
Rights, jurisdictionand duties of the coastal State
in the exclusive economic zone
1. In an area beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea, described

as the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:

(a) Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living
or non-living, of the bed and subsoil and the superjacent waters;
(b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with regard to the estab-

lishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;

(c) Exclusive jurisdiction with regard to:
i) Other activities for the economic exploitation and
exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy
from the water, currents and winds; and
(ii) Scientific research.
(d) Jurisdiction with regard to the preservation of the marine
environment, including pollution control and abatement;
(e) Other rights and duties provided for in the present Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under the
present Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal
State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the bed and
subsoil shall be exercised in accordance with Chapter IV.
Article 46
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or
landlocked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of the present
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cated. The words "related to navigation and communication" do
arguably permit almost any use of ocean space. But while accepting the economic zone, the territorialists and like-minded States are
giving up nothing but a questionable claim to a 200-mile territorial
sea. The maritime States are giving up many of the high seas
rights33 clearly and unequivocally accorded to them by the 1958 Geneva Conventions.3 4 In exchange for this immense concession, the
maritime States seek more than an arguable right to exercise high
seas freedoms in the zone. Because most States agree that these
rights may in fact be exercised, it seems unusual to balk at saying
so in the Convention.
There are other predictable difficulties. Article 75 of the RSNT
sets forth the broad philosophical principle that the economic zone
is not high seas. Such a declaration is almost certain to be
enshrined in any future international litigation, while the detailed
rights of coastal and other States respecting the zone are likely to
be viewed as mere contractual arrangements between States parties. This construction would have a considerable impact upon the
positions of those States who may choose not to sign the Convention but who prefer to rely upon sweeping statements as evidence
of their own unilaterally claimed jurisdiction. Article 75, if agreed
to by a large number of nations, would indeed give great weight
to this position.
Another concern is that treaties tend to be expansively interpreted. The 1958 Conventions quickly became inadequate for the
Convention, the freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines and other internationally
lawful uses of the sea related to navigation and communication.
2. Articles 77 to 103 and other pertinent rules of international
law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not
incompatible with this Chapter.
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under
the present Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall
have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and
shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal
State in conformity with this Chapter and other rules of international law.
33. Article 2, Convention on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, in force Sept. 30, 1962.
34. Some obervers argue that the 1958 Conventions do not represent the
will of the international community because they were executed under pressure from the maritime powers and because many nations were colonies
at the time and had no say in the negotiations; thus they may not now be
bound by the results.

tasks for which they were designed because the pressures of technology forced interpretations of their provisions they could no
longer sustain. Rights provided for in that Convention were not
clearly stated and were liberally rather than conservatively viewed.
The economic zone could be subject to the same fate. In this situation it would seem wise to be as precise as possible to avoid the
risk that in the future the Convention might be so liberally interpreted as to support claims to functional equivalents of a territorial
sea. Jurisdiction does in fact creep, but the new treaty should
encourage stability.
One additional important consideration should be noted. The
maritime States are not the only nations affected by a strong
coastal State tilt in the economic zone. A number of landlocked,
geographically disadvantaged States (LL/GDS) 5 are not in a
position to benefit from such a zone. They either have no economic
zone or their zones are so restricted because of their geography that
their potential benefits are severely reduced. 36 These States see
their access to the ocean's resources threatened by strong exclusive
economic zones. In order to protect their position, they have
opposed a territorialist approach to the creation of the zone and
have instead supported a high seas status more compatible with
their overall goals. The coalescence of the interests of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States with those of the
maritime States has divided the Committee almost evenly on the
economic zone issue and will continue to do so until an accommodation is reached.
During the last session of the New York Conference, the LL/GDS
struggled to find a way out of their dilemma. A formal group of
coastal States was formed, and a selected number from both groups
met to negotiate. Negotiations have not yet achieved success.
Similarly, the Committee II, while successful in narrowing the differences, made little real progress. Chairman Aguilar, in his final
report, indicated that "the group was very close to reaching a generally acceptable solution. 'sr However, his emphasis was upon Arti35. The landlocked States are easily identified. Most are in Africa, and
only two are in Latin America. The identification of the geographically
disadvantaged States is not so easy, for the Conference has not been able
to produce a legal definition of what disadvantages a country.

36. The primary benefits sought by the LL/GDS concern access to the
sea (transit rights), access to resources, and a share of the revenues from

the outer continental shelf beyond 200-nautical miles. These subjects are
dealt with, albeit not to their satisfaction, in Articles 58, 59, 70, and 109-15 of
the RSNT, supra note 16, pt. 11.
37. Para. 25, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/L. 17 (1976).
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cles 44 and 46 as the basis for a compromise that would "avoid assimilating the exclusive economic zone in any way to the territorial
sea or the high seas." He also suggested that formulas had been tabled which were favorably received during the last days of the session and which could provide the basis for a final compromise. This
evaluation disregards the principle of Article 75, which remains an
unnegotiated, overlooked, and ignored threat to the interests of
the maritime States and the LL/GDS group. The language of
Santo Domingo was an indication that something similar to Article
75 had been a strategic Latin objective throughout, and it remains
the cornerstone of their position. While the Latin States have consistently adhered to the Santo Domingo doctrine since 1972, the
maritime powers have just as consistently moved toward the
acceptance of more and more coastal States' rights in the zone.
This statement is undeniably true with respect to the conduct of
marine scientific research and to the protection of the marine
environment.
PROGNOSIS

The confusion in Committee II on the issue of the economic zone
rebuts the view of President Amerisinghe that all that needs to
be done is to tie up loose ends. Admittedly, the major hurdle for
the UNCLOS continues to be Committee I. But the economic
zone and questions concerning the rights of the LL/GDS,38 the continental margin, 39 and marine scientific research in the zone 4°
remain important, unresolved issues for a large number of nationsissues which must be resolved to the general satisfaction of all
before the UNCLOS can move to a successful conclusion. The
only alternative to general acceptance is a treaty to which certain
States could become signatories. This treaty would be contrary
to the intent of the "gentleman's agreement" 41 upon which the
38. Articles 58 & 59, RSNT, supra note 16, pt. II.
39. Articles 64 & 70, id.
40. Ch.II, id. pt. IM.
41. The "Gentlemen's Agreement," approved by the U.N. General Assembly at its 2169th meeting on November 16, 1973, reads as follows:
Bearing in mind that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole and the desirability

of adopting a Convention on the Law of the Sea which will secure
the widest possible acceptance,
The Conference should make every effort to reach agreement on

UNCLOS was launched and operates. However, even assuming that
all nations for whatever reason agreed to sign, it is questionable
how long such a treaty would endure as an effective set of rules.
Although the economic-zone concept was in many ways conceived
as a political compromise between opposing viewpoints, it is unlikely that many countries have backed away from strictly parochial ideas about the zone. If a lasting solution to the problem
is to be found, the interests of the various countries with respect
to the zone must be identified and understood. Separating demands for access to the resources (and those rights closely related
to these demands) from demands to access to the area unrelated
to resources is necessary. It is upon this basis that a natural division lies. The international community is probably prepared to
view exclusive rights to resources as acceptable demands on the
part of the coastal State. However, a large number of important
developed and developing countries are not prepared to accept
further exclusive demands on the part of coastal States simply
because they might be in the broader interest of the international
community and might lead toward stability and rational management of ocean space. Clearly, a division of the oceans among
nations is not appropriate now, for it is politically unacceptable.
Nevertheless, because of real needs, resources adjacent to the coasts
of nations ought to be under the nation's aegis. To go much beyond
this point raises legitimate fears of neo-colonialism on a scale far
beyond the celebrated projected resource "grab" frequently the subject of Committee I negotiations. The UNCLOS, if it is to be
successful, must recognize that lasting rules must address only
legitimate and pressing needs. Older regimes should be left
untouched to operate as they have in the past until a pressing need
exists to set them aside and until the entire international community is ready to give its consent.
Many observers believe that Ambassador Aguilar is correct when
he finds that there are proposals which may help to solve the difficulties in Articles 44 and 46. Such proposals began to appear
toward the end of the last session, although little time existed to
consider or refine them. Moreover, it is not at all clear how broad
the support for these proposals would in fact be. Outside the
coastal States group there is little support for the sweeping thesis
substantive matters by way of consensus and there should be no
voting on such matters until all efforts at consensus have been exhausted.
Procedurally, this agreement is reflected in the Conference Rules of Procedure, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/30/Rev. 2, Rule 37.
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that these Articles contain the full solution to the economic zone
problem. One simply cannot ignore the fact that many States have
extreme difficulty in accepting Article 75 as it is presently written.
Some may in fact never accede to the principle because the
philosophy of Article 75 is anathema to them. Furthermore, the
subject has not been adequately aired. How States would have
viewed the Evensen texts if they had perceived that subsequently
such an article would be interjected is uncertain.
The answer to Ambassador Aguilar's dilemma is real negotiation
on the Article 75 issue. With the kind of statesmanship he has
demonstrated in the past, a fair solution should not be beyond his
grasp. Whatever the accommodation may eventually be, neither
side is prepared to accept an explicit denial of its view of the
economic zone. Therefore, prejudicial language would not be
acceptable to either. If an accommodation is reached and the rights
and duties of States spelled out appropriately and fairly in Articles
44 and 46, international accord will not be far behind. Committee
II will then be in the position of breathing new life into the
UNCLOS by a significant breakthrough.
However, the longer the work on Article 75 is delayed, the more
temptations there will be to reopen Articles long thought to be laid
to rest. Signs of such pressures are already extant. When these
pressures occur, the risk increases that the Committee will be
drawn away from its serious negotiating effort through a series of
rear-guard actions. As a result, general debate may be reopened
across the board, defeating any real chance for significant progress.
The UNCLOS has indeed come a long way in three short years.
The texts in existence, while not agreed to, are a credit to the skill,
diligence, and ingenuity of the UNCLOS leadership. Significantly, the leadership has been able to guide the UNCLOS to serious consideration of the major outstanding issues, and the skill and
knowledge are available to solve these problems. Nothing should
be done now to prevent the negotiated solution of these problems.
While that result is near, we must be extremely careful to
accurately gauge the true interests at stake and not to be swept
up in an unfortunate fever to drive for "cheap victories" that will
in the final analysis serve no nation. Patience and a high degree
of statesmanship continue to be the order of the Law of the Sea
Conference.

